En 2008, Michael Lewis, autor del esencial Liar’s Poker, escribió lo que considero el mejor artículo sobre la crisis de subprime. Un grupo de escépticos coincide azarosamente, deciden hacer el análisis de riesgo que ninguno de los bancos estaba haciendo y, siguiendo los números, apuestan en contra de la histeria masiva.
In retrospect, pretty much all of the riskiest subprime-backed bonds were worth betting against; they would all one day be worth zero. But at the time Eisman began to do it, in the fall of 2006, that wasn’t clear. He and his team set out to find the smelliest pile of loans they could so that they could make side bets against them with Goldman Sachs or Deutsche Bank. What they were doing, oddly enough, was the analysis of subprime lending that should have been done before the loans were made: Which poor Americans were likely to jump which way with their finances? How much did home prices need to fall for these loans to blow up? (It turned out they didn’t have to fall; they merely needed to stay flat.) The default rate in Georgia was five times higher than that in Florida even though the two states had the same unemployment rate. Why? Indiana had a 25 percent default rate; California’s was only 5 percent. Why?
Lo que no sabían es que el sistema estaba tan podrido que la misma banca de inversión en contra de la cual apostaban, los necesitaba para seguir produciendo dinero de la nada.
Un texto sobre insiders escrito por un ex-insider. Lectura obligada si tienes un mediano interés por las finanzas, o quieres impresionar a alguien después de ver Wall Street: money never sleeps.
via The End Of Wall Streets Boom – News Markets – Portfolio.com.
